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A B S T R A C T
Climate policies do not affect all power producers equally. In this paper, we evaluate the supply-side
distributional consequences of emissions reduction policies using a simple and novel partial equilibrium model
where production takes place in technology-specific sites. In a quantitative application hydro, wind and solar
firms generate power combining capital and sites which differ in productivity. In contrast, the productivity
levels of coal, gas and nuclear technologies are constant across sites. We parameterise the model to analyse the
effects of stylised tax and subsidy schemes. Carbon pricing outperforms all other instruments and, crucially,
leads to more equitable outcomes on the supply side. Technology-specific and uniform subsidies to carbon-free
producers result in a greater welfare cost and their supply-side distributional impacts depend on how they are
financed. Power consumption taxes have exceptionally high welfare costs and should not be the instrument of
choice to reduce emissions or to finance subsidies aiming to reduce emissions.
1. Introduction
Fossil fuel use by the power sector is the largest source of carbon
emissions in most countries. According to the International Energy
Agency, power and heat production currently accounts for about 40%
of carbon emissions from fuel combustion globally and among the
OECD and EU member countries (IEA, 2018). In addition, the de-
mand for power is expected to grow when transport, heating and
perhaps parts of industry are electrified as part of their decarbonisation
strategies (Fankhauser, 2013). Therefore, the decarbonisation of the
power sector is crucial to meet countries’ climate targets under the
Paris Agreement, motivating many governments to introduce policies
tailored to this end.
It is well-known that the distribution of the costs and benefits
of these policies vary across producers, consumers and the govern-
ment (Goulder and Parry, 2008). However, there are also differing
impacts within those groups which can be very heterogeneous. The
existing literature has focused predominantly on the demand side.1 In
this paper we study an oft-neglected aspect of the problem, namely the
supply-side distributional impacts of climate policies within the power
sector.
We propose a simple deterministic partial equilibrium model of the
power sector with multiple generation technologies. We use the model
to compare policy instruments deployed by governments around the
world to reduce emissions. These instruments include carbon pricing,
∗ Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: l.b.doda@lse.ac.uk (B. Doda), S.Fankhauser@lse.ac.uk (S. Fankhauser).
1 See for example reviews by Dechezleprêtre and Sato (2017) for industrial power consumers, particularly those which are energy intensive and trade exposed,
and Farrell and Lyons (2016) for households at different points of the income distribution.
taxes on and subsidies to inputs or outputs of various generators,
and power consumption taxes, all standardised to achieve the same
reduction in emissions. Throughout we keep track of the policies’ fiscal
implications.
The model is stylised and has a macroeconomic flavour. Given
exogenous government policies, input prices and a demand function,
it determines the power market equilibrium. The time horizon for
the analysis is long enough to abstract from sub-hourly to annual
fluctuations in supply and demand, but short enough to take technology
as approximately constant. We abstract from market imperfections and
externalities that arise in the climate change context and focus only on
emissions reductions. There are several such market failures including
innovation and network externalities, learning-by-doing, barriers to the
adoption of energy efficiency measures, each potentially warranting
policy intervention (Bowen and Fankhauser, 2017). We assume other
instruments are deployed to address these market failures.
A novel feature of our model is that production takes place at
technology-specific sites, which can differ in productivity. This is a
standard element of the more detailed dispatch models and we in-
troduce it here because site-specific differences in productivity are
a key characteristic of renewable technologies. In response to policy
intervention, a representative firm per technology decides whether to
develop new sites (i.e. the extensive margin) and/or adjust the quantity
of inputs at each operational site (i.e. the intensive margin) to maximise
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2019.111205
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the discounted value of its profits. The firm’s profits are positive in our
model due to decreasing returns to scale at each site.
Site-specific factors have a bearing on power sector decisions in
three important ways. First, a site’s physical geography is relevant for
a given generation technology’s productivity at that site. For example,
a deep valley with a robust and predictable water flow in Norway
can be a highly productive hydro power site but is not suitable at all
for solar generation. Second, as the share of power generated from
intermittent sources rises, it becomes increasingly costly to provide
ancillary services using the existing grid technology and infrastructure
as well as institutional/market arrangements. These factors, which we
refer to as system-level technology constraints, affect a site’s technology-
specific productivity based on the amount of power already being
generated using the technology. Finally, regardless of a site’s intrinsic
productivity political-economy constraints may preclude its develop-
ment. For example, a country may ban the development of additional
fossil fuel or nuclear sites for reasons other than climate policy which
is equivalent to new sites having zero productivity.
When we explore our model quantitatively, we consider six tech-
nologies in two broad groups. The productivity of wind, hydro and
solar generation differs across sites whereas for coal, gas and nuclear
the productivity of all available sites are the same. We parameterise the
productivity of the technologies in the first group assuming that physi-
cal geography factors are most relevant for hydro, and that system-level
technological constraints are increasingly costly for wind and solar
when the market penetration by these technologies is high. For the
second group of technologies, we assume that firms are free to adjust
the scale of production at the existing sites but cannot develop addi-
tional sites due to political-economy constraints. Note that in reality
when all three constraints are relatively slack for a given technology,
one would expect to observe almost-corner solutions such as hydro in
Norway, nuclear in France and coal in Poland. We parameterise the
model in a way that site-specific constraints are binding, as is the case
for example in Spain.
In our quantitative analysis we do not attempt a detailed calibration
targeting a specific power sector. This is because our stylised model
simply does not have the high institutional, technological and temporal
resolution required to make its predictions align with the historical
observations. While one can add these features, as in power dispatch
and generation expansion models, or more generally in energy system,
computable general equilibrium (CGE) and integrated assessment mod-
els (IAMs), doing so adds complexity rendering these models something
of a black box.2 In contrast, the mechanisms at work in our model are
transparent and focus on the key interactions between the consumers,
producers and government.
We use the model’s consistent equilibrium framework to compare
the welfare effects of alternative policies. We design these policies as
stylised proxies for real-world instruments. For example, the carbon
price we model is much like the allowance price in the EU’s Emissions
Trading System or the UK’s carbon price support. The favourable loans
that Germany’s government-owned development bank KfW provides
to renewable energy projects are akin to our capital input subsidies.
Similarly, our output subsidies to carbon-free firms could stand in for
renewable obligations, feed-in-tariffs or feed-in-premiums. When their
costs are passed on to power consumers, as in Germany and the UK for
example, the effective price of power is higher, which we model as a
power consumption tax. Against this backdrop, our welfare measure
in comparing alternative policies is the sum of changes, relative to
the benchmark, in discounted value of (𝑖) consumer surplus; (𝑖𝑖) firms’
profit streams net of site development costs; and (𝑖𝑖𝑖) government’s net
revenues.
2 Pindyck (2017) argues against the use of complex IAMs and recommends
instead reliance on ‘‘relatively simple, transparent, and easy-to-understand
models’’ to inform export opinion for climate policy making. Gambhir et al.
(2019) make the case for using simple analytical models to supplement IAMs.
We highlight four main results. First, carbon pricing achieves the
targeted emissions reductions at the least cost to society. This is not
new but our model highlights the benefit of a carbon price in treating
carbon-free firms neutrally. Specifically, in equilibrium carbon pricing
increases the carbon-free firms’ value by raising the market price of
power for all firms equally.
Second and conversely, the welfare cost of a power consumption
tax is very high because it reduces the value of all firms by shrinking
the market and destroys a substantial share of consumer surplus by
raising the power price. From a welfare perspective it should not be the
instrument of choice to reduce emissions or finance subsidies aiming to
reduce emissions.3
Third, technology-specific subsidies are significantly more costly
than carbon pricing. Such subsidies provide a competitive edge to the
recipient relative to the others. Crucially, the latter group includes
carbon-free firms which lose market share and face a decline in value.
A uniform subsidy to carbon-free technologies performs better than
technology-specific subsidies. However, its welfare cost is still much
higher than carbon pricing.
Finally, technology-specific subsidies financed by carbon pricing
imply a more equitable distribution of the benefits and costs of climate
policies than when they are financed by general tax revenues, borrow-
ing or power consumption taxes. This is because the negative impact on
the profits of the carbon-free firms which do not receive the subsidy is
more than offset by the increase in power price implied by the carbon
price required to pay for the subsidy.
These four results leverage the simplicity of our model which per-
mits a joint treatment of not only power producers and consumers but
also the government whose fiscal position is impacted. Taken together,
the results show that for power producers carbon pricing delivers a
more equitable distribution of the pain and gain associated with climate
policies without placing undue burden on the society in aggregate.
Next we provide a brief overview of the related literature. Section 3
describes the theoretical model and its equilibrium. Sections 4 and 5
explain our quantitative approach and discuss the results of the quanti-
tative analysis. Section 6 concludes. There are four online appendixes.
Appendix A contains further details on model parameterisation. Ap-
pendix B offers examples of government policies in the context of the
model. Appendix C contains modelling results with site development
subsidies. Appendix D provides a sensitivity analysis.
2. Related literature
Power is essential for virtually every modern economic activity so
the literature on the power sector is voluminous. Two specific chal-
lenges of power markets are that first, demand and supply must balance
in real time; and second, the existing capital stock and infrastructure
used in generating, transmitting and distributing power is carbon-
intensive. Against this backdrop, the very-short-run energy security
concerns associated with the intermittent but carbon-free renewable
generation interact with the very-long-run concerns related to climate
change which requires that dispatchable but carbon-intensive thermal
generation must be phased out.
The government’s role in addressing these concerns and the tools
available to it to promote reliable carbon-free generation have attracted
considerable attention in the literature. Borenstein (2012) and Joskow
(2011) provide a general overview of the economics of renewable
generation. Mechanisms to induce the optimal generation mix between
intermittent renewables and dispatchable thermal generation is the fo-
cus of Ambec and Crampes (2012) who highlight the trade-offs between
3 We overestimate the impact on consumer surplus because any second
order effects due to R&D investments triggered by higher prices are absent.
By improving the productivity of technologies converting power to power
services, these investments would limit, but not eliminate, the decline in
consumer surplus.
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various options if state-contingent pricing is not feasible. Goulder and
Parry (2008), Fischer and Preonas (2010) and Schmalensee (2012)
evaluate, albeit informally, several policy instruments that have been
popular with governments.
More formally, applied theoretical approaches rely on computer
models with a detailed description of power supply and demand to
evaluate renewable policies ex ante (e.g. Rausch and Mowers (2014),
Palmer and Burtraw (2005)) and ex post (e.g. Abrell et al. (2017)).
A broad conclusion of these studies is that renewable subsidies or
portfolio standards are costly. Reguant (2019) analyses the interac-
tion between large-scale renewable energy policies and retail pricing
schemes. Solving the model for Californian power sector, the paper
finds that combinations of renewable energy and retail price policies
which pass on the costs to consumers at the margin are preferable
from a welfare standpoint, much like in the current paper. Although
the distributional implications of policies for generators is not its focus,
the conclusions of Reguant (2019) along this dimension also align with
our findings.
CGE and electricity models have also been used widely to study
energy sector implications of the transition to a low-carbon economy.
Two recent Special Issues, one in Energy Economics (EE-SI) introduced
by Murray et al. (2018) and the other in Climate Change Economics
(CCE-SI) introduced by Fawcett et al. (2018), report the results of
the model comparison exercise EMF32 for the US economy. The EE-SI
focuses on the impact of imposing a carbon price on only the power
sector under alternative assumptions for future technology and eco-
nomic environment, while the CCE-SI considers the repercussions from
economy-wide carbon taxes of different specifications under alternative
revenue recycling options.
The high-level conclusion of the EE-SI is that the EMF32 models
agree the US power sector decarbonisation through carbon pricing
is feasible, cost-effective and robust to economic and technological
uncertainty. Distributional implications for households and for energy
intensive trade exposed sectors are at the forefront of the analysis
in the CCE-SI. The Special Issue concludes that the magnitude of
emissions reductions are not sensitive to the type of recycling scheme.
However, Jorgenson et al. (2018) find that it is more efficient but also
more regressive to reduce capital taxes because of their positive and
persistent effect on the stock of capital than labour taxes which provide
real wage incentives for greater labour supply. Lump sum transfers to
households fare the worst among the recycling options considered. Zhu
et al. (2018) in CCE-SI evaluates an additional recycling option, namely
subsidies to renewable energy production and concludes that its wel-
fare cost is particularly high. None of these analyses focus on the
distributional implications for power generators.
The models used in this and similar model comparison exercises
analyse the transition over many decades, and often embed a detailed
description of the power sector within an energy sector, which in
a CGE model itself is but one of the several moving parts. Other
country-specific CGE models, such as Weigt et al. (2013) for Germany
and Goulder et al. (2016) for the USA, are used to evaluate renewable
energy policies. Böhringer et al. (2017) and Garcia-Muros et al. (2017)
go a step further and couple CGE modelling with microsimulation
analysis to take a closer look at the distributional impacts of policies for
households. Respectively, they find that in Germany and Spain existing
policies have been regressive.
Using a dynamic general equilibrium model which features much
less sectoral detail than CGE models, Kalkuhl et al. (2012) and Kalkuhl
et al. (2013) evaluate the welfare cost of alternative climate change
policies. In their setup, energy is produced using a generic carbon-
emitting technology and two carbon-free technologies, renewable and
nuclear. Kalkuhl et al. (2012) studies how to best address the learning-
by-doing externality which only affects the renewable technology. The
authors compare the welfare cost of canonical technology support
policies. They find that a carbon tax is a poor instrument to ad-
dress the learning-by-doing externality and that subsidies financed by
lumpsum taxes, feed-in-tariffs and well-designed renewable portfolio
standards typically perform better. Kalkuhl et al. (2013) abstracts from
the learning-by-doing externality but introduces the policy constraint
that optimal carbon prices can only be imperfectly implemented, if
at all. The authors find that replacing optimal carbon prices with
permanent renewable subsidies implies ‘‘disastrous welfare losses’’ and
provide a welfare ranking of alternative policies, echoing some of our
conclusions.
Liski and Vehviläinen (2016) is similar in spirit to our paper but
analyses the specific circumstances of the Nordic power market. The
authors argue that the cost of subsidies to the entry of new wind
capacity is biased upwards if it fails to take into account the decline in
the rents extracted by incumbent generators. In a carefully constructed
quantitative analysis of the Nordic case, the authors find that taking
this channel into account, there are in fact gains for consumers at the
expense of the incumbent generators’ pure rents. Focusing on the Irish
Single Electricity Market, Di Cosmo and Malaguzzi Valeri (2014) finds
that additional wind capacity coming online reduces the profits of the
incumbent fossil fuel generators but to a greater extent for the more
flexible gas plants.
3. Model
The model is a deterministic partial equilibrium model of the power
sector, where representative firms operate 𝑁 distinct power generation
technologies to satisfy a price-elastic demand in a frictionless market.
Firms choose the production sites to develop for each technology as
well as the quantity of factor inputs to deploy at each site to maximise
their profits. The government aims to implement carbon emission
reductions relative to a benchmark equilibrium by introducing taxes
and/or subsidies that alter the incentives facing the firms. The power
price adjusts endogenously to clear the market and we use the new
equilibrium allocations to compute the implied changes in the value of
firms, the consumer surplus and the government’s fiscal position. We
abstract from transition dynamics and solely focus on the differences
between these two stationary equilibria.
Production technologies
There are 𝑁 distinct power generation technologies indexed by 𝑖 =
1, 2,… , 𝑁 . Production takes place at technology-specific sites indexed
by 𝑠𝑖 ≥ 0. We treat 𝑠𝑖 as continuous for simplicity, and assign the
indexes so that 𝑠𝑖 = 0 is the most productive site and that productivity
declines as 𝑠𝑖 increases. We assume a previously undeveloped site can
be developed by incurring an immediate one-time fixed cost of 𝜓𝑖 ≥ 0
which accounts for the resource costs associated with environmental
impact assessments, establishing the productivity of a site, legal and
administrative process that may need to be completed etc. Capital must
then be installed at this site to produce power and it depreciates at
the constant rate 𝛿𝑖 after production. Capital stock evolves according
to 𝑘𝑖𝑡+1 = (1 − 𝛿𝑖)𝑘𝑖𝑡 + 𝑥𝑖𝑡 where 𝑥𝑖𝑡 denotes investment in period 𝑡.
A developed site 𝑠𝑖 combines 𝑘𝑖𝑡 and possibly fossil fuel input 𝑒𝑖𝑡 to
generate power using
𝑞𝑖(𝑘𝑖𝑡, 𝑒𝑖𝑡; 𝑠𝑖) = 𝐴𝑖(𝑠𝑖)𝐹𝑖(𝑘𝑖𝑡, 𝑒𝑖𝑡)
where technology- and site-specific productivity is given by 𝐴𝑖(𝑠𝑖)
and 𝐹𝑖(𝑘𝑖𝑡, 𝑒𝑖𝑡) is a production function satisfying the Inada conditions.
Since sites are ordered by productivity as 𝑠𝑖 increases, site productivity
declines, i.e. 𝑑𝐴𝑖(𝑠𝑖)∕𝑑𝑠𝑖 ≤ 0.
Firms and profit maximisation
Generation technology 𝑖 is operated by a representative firm, also
indexed by 𝑖. Firm 𝑖 maximises the discounted value of its profits. When
solving firm 𝑖’s problem, we suppress the technology and firm indexes
in this section to avoid clutter. The focus is on the solution to the
profit maximisation problem of the firm in a stationary environment
where all variables the firm takes as given are constant over time. These
variables include the output and input prices the firm faces {𝑝, 𝑝𝑘, 𝑝𝑒}
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as well as the site development cost 𝜓 . To maximise profits, the firm
chooses whether or not to develop a site and, if developed, the quantity
of inputs to use at that site. That is, the firm chooses the optimal values
of 𝑠, 𝑘 and 𝑒.
It is helpful to study the firm’s problem in two steps. We first
consider the intensive margin where capital and fuel inputs are chosen
to maximise profit in a given (developed) site, 𝑠. The per-period profit
from this site is
𝜋(𝑘, 𝑒; 𝑠) = 𝑝𝐴(𝑠)𝐹 (𝑘, 𝑒) − 𝑝𝑘𝛿𝑘 − 𝑝𝑒𝑒
where we have already imposed the restriction that in the stationary
environment we analyse capital will be constant over time and so
𝑥𝑡 = 𝛿𝑘 in all periods other than the initial period. The value of the
site must include the original site development cost 𝜓 and the cost of
capital 𝑝𝑘𝑘 paid in the initial period denoted 𝑡 = 0. The discounted
value of profits from the site is given by
𝑣(𝑘, 𝑒; 𝑠) =
∞∑
𝑡=0
𝛽𝑡𝜋(𝑠, 𝑘, 𝑒) − 𝑝𝑘𝑘 − 𝜓
=
1
1 − 𝛽
𝜋(𝑠, 𝑘, 𝑒) − 𝑝𝑘𝑘 − 𝜓 (1)
where 𝛽 is the firm’s discount factor. Then the profit maximising
choices 𝑘∗(𝑠) and 𝑒∗(𝑠) must satisfy
𝐹1
(
𝑘∗(𝑠), 𝑒∗(𝑠)
)
=
1
𝐴(𝑠)
𝑝𝑘
𝑝
(1 − 𝛽 + 𝛿) (2)
𝐹2
(
𝑘∗(𝑠), 𝑒∗(𝑠)
)
=
1
𝐴(𝑠)
𝑝𝑒
𝑝
(3)
It is straightforward to show that Eqs. (2), (3) and the Inada
conditions imply 𝑘∗(𝑠) > 0 and 𝑒∗(𝑠) > 0. Moreover, if 𝑑𝐴(𝑠)∕𝑑𝑠 < 0,
both 𝑘∗(𝑠) and 𝑒∗(𝑠) are decreasing. Finally, under the same premise
the envelope theorem implies 𝑑𝑣 (𝑘∗, 𝑒∗; 𝑠) ∕𝑑𝑠 < 0. In words, less
productive sites generate smaller profits for the firm.
Having determined the optimal input choices at the intensive mar-
gin, we next consider the extensive margin. That is, the second step
in the profit maximisation problem is to determine the sites which are
profitable to operate. Ignoring the trivial case when 𝑣(𝑘∗, 𝑒∗; 0) ≤ 0 and
the technology is idle, the firm decides whether or not to develop a
given site based on the site’s potential contribution to profits.
Formally, when 𝑣(𝑘∗, 𝑒∗; 0) > 0 and 𝑑𝐴(𝑠)∕𝑑𝑠 < 0, there exists a site
?̄? > 0 such that
𝑣
(
𝑘∗(?̄?), 𝑒∗(?̄?); ?̄?
)
= 0. (4)
Below we refer to the site ?̄? that satisfies (4) as the marginal site. All
sites with 𝑠 ≤ ?̄? are profitable to develop and the firm’s input choices
in these sites satisfy (2) and (3). Conversely, the discounted value of
profits from the sites with 𝑠 > ?̄? is negative so the firm leaves them
undeveloped with 𝑘∗(𝑠) = 0 and 𝑒∗(𝑠) = 0.
With the marginally profitable site ?̄? so determined, we can express
the implications of profit maximisation for key endogenous variables in
full. Using capital letters to distinguish firm-level variables from site-
level variables and re-introducing technology/firm index 𝑖, we have
𝑌𝑖 = ∫
?̄?𝑖
0
𝑦𝑖(𝑠𝑖)𝑑𝑠𝑖 (5)
where the variable 𝑦𝑖 can stand in for any element of {𝑘
∗
𝑖
(𝑠𝑖), 𝑒
∗
𝑖
(𝑠𝑖),
𝑞∗
𝑖
(𝑠𝑖), 𝑣
∗
𝑖
(𝑠𝑖)}. For example, 𝑄
∗
𝑖
= ∫ ?̄?𝑖
0
𝑞𝑖(𝑠𝑖)𝑑𝑠𝑖 is the total power gen-
eration by all the sites firm 𝑖 operating technology 𝑖 has developed
and is operating. This implies that the value of the firm is given by
𝑉 ∗
𝑖
= ∫ ?̄?𝑖
0
𝑣𝑖(𝑠𝑖)𝑑𝑠𝑖 and that the aggregate value of all firms is 𝑉
∗ =
∑
𝑖 𝑉
∗
𝑖
Government
Government policy is exogenous and has two components. First, the
government can restrict site space available to firms using a licensing
parameter (𝜎𝑖) so that only sites 𝑠𝑖 ≤ 𝜎𝑖 can be operated. Second,
the government can introduce a collection of technology-specific ad
valorem taxes/subsidies on output (𝜏𝑖), capital (𝜏
𝑘
𝑖
), fossil fuels (𝜏𝑒
𝑖
)
and site development costs (𝜏𝜓
𝑖
) of firm 𝑖. The government policies are
collected in the matrix
𝛤 =
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
𝜎1 𝜎2 … 𝜎𝑁
𝜏1 𝜏2 … 𝜏𝑁
𝜏𝑘
1
𝜏𝑘
2
… 𝜏𝑘
𝑁
𝜏𝑒
1
𝜏𝑒
2
… 𝜏𝑒
𝑁
𝜏
𝜓
1
𝜏
𝜓
2
… 𝜏
𝜓
𝑁
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
(6)
One can think of 𝑠𝑖 ∈ [0, 𝜎𝑖] as sites for which the government has
issued a license, a precondition for site development by assumption.4
For example, if the government sets 𝜎𝑖 = 0, it precludes generation
by firm 𝑖 by fiat. Conversely, if 𝜎𝑖 is greater than ?̄?𝑖 that would obtain
under laissez-faire, it will have no effect on equilibrium allocations.
We will later use 𝜎𝑖 to incorporate in the model the political-economy
constraints highlighted in the Introduction.
Regarding the taxes and subsidies, each entry can be positive repre-
senting a tax, negative representing a subsidy, or zero representing no
intervention. A carbon price 𝜏𝑐 satisfies 𝜏𝑐 = 𝜏𝑒
𝑐
= 2𝜏𝑒
𝑔
because per unit
of energy coal approximately has twice the carbon content of gas. In
our deterministic model, carbon prices can be equivalently implemented
using a carbon tax and emissions trading. For brevity, hereafter we
use carbon tax to refer to a carbon price imposed using either type of
instrument.
The matrix 𝛤𝐿𝐹 denotes the absence of any intervention by the
government. Specifically, the entries in 𝛤𝐿𝐹 are such that all 𝜎𝑖 are
large and all {𝜏𝑖, 𝜏
𝑘
𝑖
, 𝜏𝑒
𝑖
, 𝜏
𝜓
𝑖
} are zero, so the government does not impose
any additional constraints on the firms or affect their incentives. We
can now provide a more precise description of the firm-specific capital,
fossil fuel and power prices as well as site development costs
𝑝𝑘𝑖 = (1 + 𝜏
𝑘
𝑖
)?̃?𝑘, 𝑝𝑒𝑖 = (1 + 𝜏
𝑒
𝑖
)?̃?𝑒, 𝑝𝑖 = ?̃?∕(1 + 𝜏𝑖) (7)
𝜓𝑖 = (1 + 𝜏
𝜓
𝑖
)?̃?𝑖 (8)
where ?̃?𝑘 and ?̃?𝑒 are the exogenous capital and fossil fuel prices, ?̃? is the
equilibrium power price paid by the consumer per unit of energy. Note
that under 𝛤𝐿𝐹 all firms face the same prices indicated by the absence
of subscript 𝑖 from {?̃?𝑘, ?̃?𝑒, ?̃?}. In contrast, site-development costs ?̃?𝑖
may in principle vary across firms, even in the absence of government
intervention.
Demand
The demand for power is extremely simple and only depends on the
price the consumers face
𝐷(?̃?) = 𝐴𝑑𝐺(?̃?)
where 𝐴𝑑 > 0 is an exogenous shift factor and 𝐺(?̃?) is a decreasing
function. This demand function implicitly assumes that the energy
efficiency of consumers, that is, the rate at which they transform energy
to energy services as well as the technology with which they do so, do
not respond to changes in the price of power. Put differently, we assume
that the change in consumer surplus evaluated using the demand for
power, rather than the more appropriate demand for power services, is
a good approximation for consumer welfare.
Assumptions and equilibrium
Before providing a definition of the equilibrium, we discuss some
key assumptions and the simplifications they permit. First, we assume
that the equilibrium is preceded by a long enough period of constant
prices, policies and technologies. The assumption allows us to focus
on the stationary equilibrium in the long run where firms have fully
4 We assume sites are identical except in their technology-specific produc-
tivity. If alternatively some sites feature outstanding historical value, natural
beauty or biodiversity resources, 𝜎𝑖 imposed to protect them may imply
discontinuities in the permissible site space.
Energy Policy xxx (xxxx) xxx
5
B. Doda and S. Fankhauser
and freely adjusted their energy and capital use at a given site and
have developed all profitable sites. This conception of the long run
is standard (Varian, 2014, Ch. 18) and can be contrasted with the
short run where at least one productive input is fixed and the very
long run where in addition to all productive inputs, the technologies,
populations and institutions are variable.5
Second, we assume that there is perfect competition in the whole-
sale market and focus on a representative firm per technology. In
general, this can be restrictive because wholesale power markets are
characterised by a few big suppliers which may exercise market power.
Moreover, a given firm may own and operate multiple technologies
and allocate its production strategically to maximise its profits. These
deviations from perfect competition are potentially important in the
short run but are rendered less significant in the long run by the entry
of new firms, development of new sites and antitrust regulation by the
government.
Third, we study the partial equilibrium in the power sector. That
is, we assume the input prices are determined exogenously; there is no
explicit restriction on the government budget balance unless specified
otherwise; and there are no spillovers between power and other sectors
of the economy. Together these assumptions deliver a simple and
tractable model with an analytical solution for the long run equilibrium
allocations. We note that while our model generates valuable insights
about the implications of policies over this time horizon, it is virtually
silent on the real-time equilibrium dynamics of the wholesale power
market.
Definition (Equilibrium).
Given technologies 𝑖 = 1, 2,… , 𝑁 , exogenous government policy 𝛤
defined in (6), and constant input prices (?̃?𝑘, ?̃?𝑒), a market equilibrium
consists of
• a marginal site ?̄?𝑖 for each 𝑖 which
– solves equation (4) with ?̄?𝑖 ≤ 𝜎𝑖 or
– ?̄?𝑖 = 𝜎𝑖
• capital input 𝑘𝑖(𝑠) satisfying (2) for 𝑠𝑖 ≤ ?̄?𝑖 and 𝑘𝑖(𝑠) = 0 for 𝑠𝑖 > ?̄?𝑖
for all 𝑖
• energy input 𝑒𝑖(𝑠) satisfying (3) for 𝑠𝑖 ≤ ?̄?𝑖 and 𝑒𝑖(𝑠) = 0 for 𝑠𝑖 > ?̄?𝑖
for all 𝑖
• a power price ?̃? which clears the market i.e. 𝐷(?̃?) =
∑
𝑖𝑄𝑖(𝑝𝑖)
In equilibrium the generation mix across technologies and distri-
bution of profits across firms are well-defined and one can perform a
comparative static analysis of how allocations respond to alternative
policies. Below we approach these issues quantitatively.
4. Quantifying the model
The quantitative model developed below includes six technologies:
wind (𝑤), hydro (ℎ) and solar (𝑝𝑣), which feature site-specific produc-
tivity; and coal (𝑐), gas (𝑔) and nuclear (𝑛), which do not. In most
real-world power systems, these technologies account for almost all
power generation. For simplicity, we assume productivity is linear in
the site index. That is,
𝐴𝑖(𝑠𝑖) = 𝐴𝑖 − 𝜔𝑖𝑠𝑖 (9)
with 𝐴𝑖 > 0 and 𝜔𝑖 ≥ 0. We further assume that 𝐹𝑖(𝑘𝑖, 𝑒𝑖) is Cobb–
Douglas
𝐹𝑖(𝑘𝑖, 𝑒𝑖) = 𝑘
𝛼𝑖
𝑖
𝑒
𝜃𝑖
𝑖
(10)
5 In Appendix D.2, we discuss the implications of a discrete change in the
productivity of individual technologies, i.e. in 𝐴𝑖(𝑠𝑖). Expanding the set of
technologies is beyond the scope of the current paper.
Table 1
Imposed parameters.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on IEA (2015a).
𝛽𝑖 𝛼𝑖 𝜃𝑖 𝛿𝑖 𝜔𝑖 𝜓𝑖 𝐴𝑑 𝜖
Wind 0.93 0.73 0 0.17 Table 4
Hydro 0.93 0.82 0 0.06 Table 4
Solar 0.93 0.78 0 0.17 Table 4
Coal 0.93 0.31 0.58 0.11 0 0
Gas 0.93 0.12 0.82 0.14 0 0
Nuclear 0.93 0.84 0 0.07 0 0
Demand 1 −0.35
Table 2
Average generation mix in eight selected EU countries (2012–2016).
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Eurostat.
ESP DEU DNK FRA GBR ITA POL PRT EU28
Wind 0.20 0.11 0.48 0.03 0.10 0.06 0.05 0.25 0.09
Hydro 0.14 0.05 0.00 0.12 0.03 0.20 0.02 0.27 0.13
Solar 0.05 0.06 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.09 0.00 0.01 0.03
Coal 0.17 0.48 0.40 0.02 0.30 0.18 0.87 0.27 0.27
Gas 0.22 0.14 0.11 0.04 0.34 0.47 0.06 0.20 0.19
Nuclear 0.22 0.16 0.00 0.77 0.22 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.29
with cost shares of capital and fossil fuels given by 𝛼𝑖 and 𝜃𝑖, re-
spectively. We ignore labour input because its cost share in power
generation is small. These functional forms impose sufficient structure
to capture the high-level features of the six generation technologies
under some restrictions on 𝜔𝑖 and 𝜃𝑖.
The distinguishing features of hydro, wind and solar are site-specific
productivity and the absence of fossil fuel inputs from the production.
We implement this by setting 𝜔𝑖 > 0 and 𝜃𝑖 = 0 for 𝑖 ∈ {𝑤, ℎ, 𝑝𝑣}.
6 The
productivity of coal, gas and nuclear generation is site-independent but
only the former two technologies require fossil fuel inputs. Therefore,
we set 𝜔𝑖 = 0 and 𝜃𝑖 > 0 for 𝑖 ∈ {𝑐, 𝑔}, and 𝜔𝑛 = 0 and 𝜃𝑛 = 0.
7
For coal, gas and nuclear, the solution strategy for the marginal site
?̄?𝑖 no longer works because if 𝑣𝑖(𝑘𝑖, 𝑒𝑖; 0) > 0, then it is positive for all
𝑠𝑖 > 0 and the more profitable technology among the three captures
the entire market. However, complete specialisation is not observed
in practice. We capture this in the model with political-economy con-
straints due to social (e.g. NIMBYism) and/or political (e.g. lobbying by
would-be competitors) pressures that induce the government to restrict
the coal, gas and nuclear sites, even when additional sites would have
been profitable. Specifically, we assume that the government restricts
the site space to [0, 1] for these firms by setting 𝜎𝑖 = 1 for 𝑖 ∈ {𝑐, 𝑔, 𝑛}.
8
This is equivalent to shutting down site-specificity at the outset by
imposing 𝐴𝑖(𝑠𝑖) = 𝐴𝑖 so that 𝑠𝑖 is not a choice.
Given these functional form assumptions and parameter restrictions,
we now discuss how the other parameters are selected. We impose
the values of the (𝑖) discount factors, (𝑖𝑖) cost share parameters, and
(𝑖𝑖𝑖) depreciation rates based on IEA (2015b) as well as the parameters
of the demand function 𝐴𝑑 and 𝜖. These are reported in Table 1 and
additional details regarding their selection can be found in Appendix
A.1.
The remaining parameters of the model are jointly selected so that
the model’s equilibrium matches the high-level features of a well-
diversified power system, such as that of Spain. To be clear, this is not
a detailed calibration but merely ensures that the parameters of the
model are not too far from the relevant region of the parameter space.
Spain is a suitable target for a number of reasons. First, Table 2 shows
that it has a relatively balanced generation mix. Second, it has ample
6 With 𝜃𝑖 = 0, the solution to (3) trivially implies 𝑒
∗
𝑖
(𝑠𝑖) = 0.
7 Nuclear fuel costs are included in the capital costs since trade in nuclear
fuel is regulated and price-inelastic.
8 𝜎𝑖 = 1 is without loss of generality when 𝜔𝑖 = 0 because (5) implies that
in any specific parameterisation only the product 𝜎𝑖𝐴𝑖 matters for firm-level
variables.
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Table 3
Evolution of generation and emission mix in Spain.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Eurostat and IEA.
1990 2000 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2012–16
Generation (%)
Wind 0.00 0.02 0.16 0.16 0.18 0.21 0.20 0.19 0.19 0.20
Hydro 0.18 0.16 0.16 0.12 0.09 0.15 0.17 0.12 0.16 0.14
Solar 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
Coal 0.42 0.40 0.09 0.16 0.20 0.15 0.17 0.20 0.14 0.17
Gas 0.02 0.11 0.34 0.32 0.27 0.22 0.19 0.21 0.21 0.22
Nuclear 0.38 0.31 0.22 0.21 0.22 0.21 0.22 0.22 0.23 0.22
Emis.
Coal
Gas 96.67 12.05 0.74 1.44 2.03 1.93 2.63 2.53 1.86 2.20
Coal+Gas
Total 0.29 0.30 0.23 0.28 0.30 0.25 0.26 0.28 0.23 0.26
Notes: The final two rows show power sector emissions from coal and gas combustion relative to each other and their sum as a share of economy-wide emissions, respectively.
potential to expand its renewable generation, in particular hydro. In
contrast, Germany and the UK have used up a large share of their hydro
potential, which is quite small to start with (Eurelectric, 2011).
It is also not unreasonable to assume that Spain satisfies the con-
dition for a stationary equilibrium when the data are averaged over
2012–2016 to minimise the effect of year-to-year fluctuations. The
top panel of Table 3 illustrates the evolution of the Spanish power
generation mix over the 1990–2016 based on the same underlying
Eurostat data as in Table 2. Prior to 2012 one observes important and
persistent trends in the share of individual technologies. However, these
trends are much less prominent after 2012 despite the economic and
policy upheaval the country experienced in early 2010s (IEA, 2015a).
Using data from the International Energy Agency, the bottom panel
of the table shows that emissions from coal and gas are also roughly
stable after 2012, both relative to each other and as a share of aggregate
emissions.
The generation mix averaged over 2012–2016 is by itself not suf-
ficient to determine the intercept and slope parameters in 𝐴𝑖(𝑠𝑖) =
𝐴𝑖 − 𝜔𝑖𝑠𝑖 for wind, hydro and solar. In fact, three additional targets
are required to determine 𝜔𝑖 for these technologies. To that end we
use the maximum feasible generation that can be achieved given the
constraints imposed by physical geography as well as by the existing
grid technology and institutional arrangements. In Appendix A.2 we
discuss in detail how we these constraints determine the maximum
feasible generation potential. Here we note that the factors restricting
the technologies’ potential are different for hydro versus wind and
solar. Hydro potential is primarily constrained by a country’s physical
geography, e.g. its precipitation patterns, topography and river/fluvial
system. For wind and solar, physical geography also plays a role but
there are additional constraints imposed by intermittency. These are ab-
sent from the model but interact with physical geography constraints in
practice. For example, storage capacity is currently extremely limited,
and the existing grid infrastructure and power market arrangements are
not optimised for the intermittency or the spatial dispersion of wind
and solar sites.
Next we introduce four normalisations. We use capital as numeraire,
i.e. set the price of a unit of capital ?̃?𝑘 = 1. We also set the fixed site
development cost 𝜓𝑖 = 1 for wind, hydro and solar. This normalisation
is equivalent to letting site size vary across the technologies and is
innocuous so long as we are careful in interpreting the levels of ?̄?𝑖.
Finally, we determine the fossil fuel prices 𝑝𝑒𝑐 and 𝑝𝑒𝑔 assuming that
the total power sector emissions in Spain is 1. Using this along with the
fact that coal generates twice the carbon emissions that gas does per
unit of useful energy, i.e. 2𝐸𝑐 + 𝐸𝑔 = 1, we match the observed ratio
of carbon emissions from Spain’s coal and gas plants which averages
2.20 over 2012–16 as shown in the lower panel of Table 3. Given
the imposed parameters, we solve the equations which characterise
the model’s equilibrium for the remaining parameter values. Table 4
reports these parameter values and targets.
To summarise, Tables 1 and 4 provide the values of all parameters
required to compute the benchmark (hereafter BM) equilibrium of the
model. The values of the endogenous variables in the BM equilibrium
are provided in Table 5. Given our normalisations, the level of the price,
Table 4
Parameters and normalisations in benchmark model.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the paper’s model, Eurostat and IEA.
Parameter Value Note
𝐴𝑤 0.36
Target
∑
𝑖 𝑄𝑖 = 1 and 𝑖’s share in generation mix 𝑄𝑖
𝐴ℎ 0.21
𝐴𝑝𝑣 0.35
𝐴𝑐 0.47
𝐴𝑔 0.74
𝐴𝑛 0.18
𝜔𝑤 0.09
Target 𝑄𝑖∕𝑄
𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑖
= 0.50 for 𝑖 = 𝑤, 𝑝𝑣 and 𝑄ℎ∕𝑄
𝑚𝑎𝑥
ℎ
= 0.58𝜔ℎ 0.11
𝜔𝑝𝑣 0.35
?̃?𝑘 1
Normalisation
?̃?𝑤 1
?̃?ℎ 1
?̃?𝑝𝑣 1
?̃?𝑒𝑐 0.29 Target 2𝐸𝑐 + 𝐸𝑔 = 1 and 2𝐸𝑐∕𝐸𝑔 = 2.20?̃?𝑒𝑔 0.58
Table 5
Benchmark equilibrium allocations.
𝑄𝐵𝑀
𝑖
?̄?𝐵𝑀
𝑖
𝐾𝐵𝑀
𝑖
𝐸𝐵𝑀
𝑖
𝑉 𝐵𝑀
𝑖
Wind 0.195 0.566 0.596 na 0.192
Hydro 0.138 0.240 0.897 na 0.117
Solar 0.051 0.121 0.166 na 0.043
Coal 0.172 1 0.295 0.344 0.268
Gas 0.221 1 0.126 0.313 0.177
Nuclear 0.223 1 1.301 na 0.510
Aggregate 1.000 3.382 0.656 1.305
quantity and emissions are 1 in the BM equilibrium so are not shown
in the table. By construction, the generation mix in the first column is
identical to the Spanish average mix over 2012–2016. The next three
columns report the index of the marginal site for each firm9; aggregate
capital used in production; and fossil energy input for coal and gas
firms, respectively. The final column reports the value of each firm
in the BM equilibrium, which is obtained by integrating (1) over the
interval [0, ?̄?𝑖]. It can be interpreted as the firm’s stock market value.
In the next section, we keep all parameters constant but introduce
new policies. We emphasise the adjective ‘new’ because all existing
policies and distortions that have a bearing on the power market equi-
librium are subsumed into the BM parameters. Observe that with our
normalisations the levels of variables in equilibrium are not straight-
forward to interpret in monetary and physical units. Accordingly, our
focus below is on changes relative to the BM equilibrium.
9 Recall that the binding political-economy constraints are implemented by
setting 𝜎𝑐 = 𝜎𝑔 = 𝜎𝑛 = 1.
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5. Results and discussion
Our quantitative analysis fixes the stringency of new policies at
40% emissions reduction. This target is broadly in line with the EU
GHG emission targets for 2030, both in aggregate and for those sectors
covered by the EU ETS which includes the power sector.10 The fact that
the stringency is the same across policies allows us to abstract from
their climate change benefits in our analysis. A novel aspect of our
analysis is the model’s ability to keep track of the government’s fiscal
position which is described in Appendix B using examples.
We present our main results in Tables 6 and 7, which have a stan-
dardised structure. The first two rows report the percentage deviation
of aggregate variables, namely the equilibrium price and quantity. The
next three rows provide information on the response of wind, hydro and
solar generation to policy intervention. Specifically, they highlight the
relative importance of the extensive margin by reporting the additional
generation coming from the newly developed sites 𝑄𝑛𝑠
𝑖
as a share of
the policy-induced increase in generation (𝑄𝑖 − 𝑄
𝐵𝑀
𝑖
). The percentage
change in firm 𝑖’s value in response to the policy-induced changes in
equilibrium prices and allocations is given in the next six rows.
The final four rows are relevant for comparing the welfare impact
of policy interventions. They report the level differences in welfare
components relative to the BM equilibrium. Specifically, these com-
ponents are the changes in the discounted value of: the power sector
𝛥𝑉 =
∑
𝑖(𝑉𝑖 − 𝑉
𝐵𝑀
𝑖
) in aggregate; the net revenues of the government
𝛥𝑁𝑅 = 𝑁𝑅 − 𝑁𝑅
𝐵𝑀 ; and the consumer surplus 𝛥𝐶𝑆 = 𝐶𝑆 − 𝐶𝑆
𝐵𝑀 .
The overall measure of welfare 𝛥 is the sum of the preceding three
components. Welfare is measured in real terms although its units are
unspecified given our normalisations. However, the magnitudes are
comparable across components given a policy intervention, and across
policies for a given component.
5.1. Taxes and subsidies
Consider Table 6 first. The carbon, coal and power consumption
taxes in columns (i), (ii) and (iii) are set to reduce emissions by 40%. A
carbon tax increases the equilibrium power price paid by the consumer
by 2.9% and reduces demand by 1.0%, whereas a coal tax results in a
more modest increase of 1.2% in the price. In contrast, under the power
consumption tax the price paid by the consumer increases by more than
140%. An important difference between input taxes on fossil fuels and
the consumption tax is that the former increase value of all firms that
are not subject to the tax by shifting generation towards them.
The increase in generation by wind, hydro and solar firms in re-
sponse to the carbon and coal taxes comes from both the intensive
margin (i.e. by increasing capital input in existing sites) and the ex-
tensive margin (i.e. by developing new sites and installing capital)
margins. For each firm, more than half of the output expansion is
produced in newly developed sites. The consumption tax reduces the
overall size of the market and generation by each firm so no new
sites are developed. The value of all firms decline relative to the BM
equilibrium because firms receive only a fraction of the price paid by
consumers.
Among the policies we consider in this and the next section, the
carbon tax in column (i) achieves the targeted reduction in emissions
at the lowest cost. The cost is split between the coal and gas firms whose
values decline, and consumers who experience a decline in consumer
surplus. However, we note that the policy increases the values of the
carbon-free wind, hydro, solar and nuclear firms. These increases more
than compensate for the decline in the of value coal and gas firms,
i.e. 𝛥𝑉 > 0. Moreover, the carbon tax generates revenues for the
10 Coincidentally, the target is also consistent with Spain’s draft National
Energy and Climate Plan, which is available at https://ec.europa.eu/energy/
sites/ener/files/documents/spain_draftnecp.pdf.
government. To put it in perspective, this value is approximately equal
to the combined values of the solar and gas firms in the BM equilibrium.
It is, however, not large enough to compensate the consumers for the
loss in consumer surplus.
The substantial welfare cost of the power consumption tax is due
to the decline in consumer surplus relative to the BM equilibrium
and likely overestimates the actual drop in consumer surplus. This is
because we are assuming a one-to-one relationship between power and
power services. If instead power consumers can invest in improving
their energy efficiency, the loss in consumer surplus will be more
limited. However, in this case the aggregate costs of energy efficiency
investments would have to be accounted for in the welfare measure.
The takeaway message from columns (i)–(iii) is that the carbon tax
has the lowest welfare cost and does not adversely affect the values
of carbon-free firms. This is in contrast to the power consumption tax,
which is an extremely costly instrument for reducing emissions despite
the sizeable tax revenues it generates. As we demonstrate below, the
overall welfare cost of all other policies analysed below lie in between
these two extremes.
Next in columns (iv)–(x), we turn to the implications of subsidy
schemes benefiting carbon-free technologies. In column (iv) only the
wind firm is offered an output subsidy while in column (v) it is
given a capital input subsidy. Columns (vi)–(viii) provide the results
for technology-specific capital input subsidies to hydro, solar and nu-
clear, respectively. These types of subsidies are all observed in prac-
tice (CEER, 2015). The final two columns report uniform subsidies to
renewable and carbon-free technologies.
The changes in the equilibrium price and quantity are the same
across all subsidy schemes: each scheme reduces the equilibrium price
by 4.3%, increases power consumption by 1.6%. This is intuitive be-
cause without directly altering the incentives of the coal and gas firms,
the government can only induce emissions reductions by engineering
a lower equilibrium price. That is, the government implements the
subsidy necessary to induce the power price which is consistent with
the scaling back of coal and gas generation to reduce emissions. In turn
this implies that the change in the value of coal and gas firms is also
the same across columns (iv)–(x), namely −33.4% for coal and −54.6%
for gas. Interestingly, given a choice between a carbon tax and various
subsidies, both coal and gas firms would prefer the carbon tax, although
the former would do so by only a small margin. This result is driven by
the qualitatively different impact the policies have on the equilibrium
price.
Focusing on the output and capital input subsidies to wind in
columns (iv) and (v) we underline differences in the value of the wind
firm and the government’s net revenues. An output subsidy raises the
returns to all inputs used in production, creating a windfall for the
existing sites and capital stock. A capital input subsidy can discriminate
between existing and new capital. It also introduces a small distortion
between capital and sites by incentivising too high a reliance on the
intensive margin. This can be observed in the 𝛥 for these policies and in
the lower share of new wind generation by newly-developed sites under
the capital input subsidy.11 The wind firm unambiguously prefers the
output subsidy. Conversely, the government prefers the capital subsidy
because its outlays are lower under the second and it is costly to raise
the revenues required to pay for the subsidies.
Therefore, in the rest of the paper we report only the results for
capital input subsidies because they are cheaper to finance than output
subsidies. Comparing 𝛥 and 𝛥𝑁𝑅 across columns (v) and (viii), we
observe that if the government is restricted to support only one tech-
nology, trade-offs emerge. Subsidising nuclear to expand its production
11 The joint use of capital input and site development subsidies can remove
the distortion and replicate the allocations under output subsidy in column
(iv) with a smaller change in the value of the wind firm and in government
revenues. The result are omitted for brevity.
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Table 6
Implications of taxes and subsidies that reduce emissions by 40%.
Tax Technology-specific subsidy Uniform Subsidy
Carbon Coal Power Wind Wind Hydro Solar Nuclear RES RES+N
(input) (input) (output) (output) (input) (input) (input) (input) (input) (input)
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii) (ix) (x)
%𝛥(?̃?, 𝑝𝐵𝑀 ) 2.9 1.2 144.4 −4.3 −4.3 −4.3 −4.3 −4.3 −4.3 −4.3
%𝛥(
∑
𝑖 𝑄𝑖 ,
∑
𝑖 𝑄
𝐵𝑀
𝑖
) −1.0 −0.4 −26.9 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6
𝑄𝑛𝑠
𝑤
∕(𝑄𝑤 −𝑄
𝐵𝑀
𝑤
) × 100 62.9 63.3 0.0 60.2 52.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 50.2 45.5
𝑄𝑛𝑠
ℎ
∕(𝑄ℎ −𝑄
𝐵𝑀
ℎ
) × 100 50.5 50.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 43.8 0.0 0.0 42.8 40.7
𝑄𝑛𝑠
𝑝𝑣
∕(𝑄𝑝𝑣 −𝑄
𝐵𝑀
𝑝𝑣
) × 100 60.5 60.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 51.9 0.0 50.6 47.4
%𝛥(𝑉𝑤 , 𝑉
𝐵𝑀
𝑤
) 46.8 18.5 −59.4 419.7 216.6 −59.4 −59.4 −59.4 43.9 8.5
%𝛥(𝑉ℎ , 𝑉
𝐵𝑀
ℎ
) 55.8 21.7 −66.2 −66.2 −66.2 227.3 −66.2 −66.2 38.3 −6.7
%𝛥(𝑉𝑝𝑣 , 𝑉
𝐵𝑀
𝑝𝑣
) 56.2 22.0 −68.7 −68.7 −68.7 −68.7 1334.1 −68.7 67.6 18.0
%𝛥(𝑉𝑐 , 𝑉
𝐵𝑀
𝑐
) −32.9 −62.2 −33.4 −33.4 −33.4 −33.4 −33.4 −33.4 −33.4 −33.4
%𝛥(𝑉𝑔 , 𝑉
𝐵𝑀
𝑔
) −34.5 24.1 −54.6 −54.6 −54.6 −54.6 −54.6 −54.6 −54.6 −54.6
%𝛥(𝑉𝑛 , 𝑉
𝐵𝑀
𝑛
) 19.6 7.9 −24.2 −24.2 −24.2 −24.2 −24.2 55.2 −24.2 0.3
𝛥𝑉 0.130 −0.014 −0.529 0.388 −0.001 −0.187 0.068 −0.125 −0.151 −0.168
𝛥𝑁𝑅 0.217 0.099 15.543 −1.419 −1.044 −0.838 −1.732 −0.843 −0.659 −0.565
𝛥𝐶𝑆 −0.413 −0.174 −17.313 0.623 0.623 0.623 0.623 0.623 0.623 0.623
𝛥 −0.067 −0.088 −2.299 −0.408 −0.422 −0.402 −1.041 −0.345 −0.187 −0.110
Notes: Whether a tax/subsidy applies to input or output of the firm is indicated in parenthesis. Subsidies reduce the price of capital except in column (iv), where the subsidy
augments the power price for the wind firm only. RES(+N) indicates uniform capital subsidies to renewable energy sources (+ Nuclear).
substantially, say by adding new reactors at existing sites, achieves the
targeted emissions reduction at the lowest cost to society if government
is restricted to use technology-specific subsidies only but might run into
the same political-economy constraints captured by 𝜎𝑛 = 1. Moreover,
it is more costly to the government than subsidising hydro. The total
welfare and fiscal costs of subsidies to solar in column (vii) are about
twice as large as other technology-specific subsidies. In fact, in order
to reduce emissions using technology-specific subsidies to solar, the
amount that the government must spend is so large that it is greater in
magnitude than the aggregate value of all power sector firms in the BM
equilibrium in Table 5. This is because the share of solar in generation is
small to start with so its output must increase more than six-fold. Even
though subsidising wind or hydro implies much lower welfare costs,
these costs are much larger than that of a carbon tax achieving the
same target.
A final observation on the technology-specific subsidies to carbon-
free firms in columns (v)-(viii) relates to their side effects. In equilib-
rium, a technology-specific subsidy increases aggregate production and
depresses the market price for all firms. At the same time it triggers
a substantial reallocation of generation and profits across firms. This
is because facing lower input costs than its competitors, the subsidy
recipient increases production at each site, develops new sites and cap-
tures market share from its competitors. In contrast, the competitors,
who face a lower market price, reduce their production and earn lower
profits. The net result is a more unequal distribution of profits as a
direct consequence of the subsidy.
The technology-neutral subsidy schemes in columns (ix) and (x),
where all renewable and carbon-free technologies receive the same
ad valorem subsidy, can limit the total cost of the scheme to the
government, the welfare cost it imposes on society and the negative
distributional consequences on the supply side. The welfare cost of
these schemes, which simultaneously support multiple technologies,
are approximately 30%–50% lower than a subsidy to the nuclear firm,
the technology-specific alternative with the least welfare impact, in part
because they make use of the extensive margin for all renewable tech-
nologies. While this suggests technology-neutral subsidies should be
preferred to technology-specific ones, the welfare cost of a carbon tax is
lower still, and in addition, it generates revenues for the government.12
12 Site development subsidies are considered in Appendix C with results
similar to capital input subsidies.
5.2. Subsidies financed by carbon or power taxes
In Table 7 we consider policy packages where the revenues for the
subsidies must be raised within the power sector rather than using
general tax revenue or borrowing. Specifically, the first four columns,
(a)–(d) review the implications of technology-specific subsidies to re-
newable and nuclear technologies which are financed by a carbon tax,
while columns (e) and (f) do the same for a uniform subsidy to all
renewable and carbon-free technologies. In the final two columns, we
report the results when the revenues from power consumption taxes
pay for the uniform subsidies. In practice, both carbon prices and power
consumption taxes have been used to pay for subsidy outlays in EU
countries.
The value of coal and gas firms decline in columns (a)–(d) as they
are adversely affected by both the carbon tax and a subsidy to one
of their competitors. For a carbon-free firm that is not receiving the
subsidy, the outcome is less clear a priori. On the one hand, the carbon
tax gives them a comparative advantage relative to coal and gas. On the
other hand, the subsidy to a carbon-free competitor can reverse some
or all of this advantage. Quantitatively, each of these interventions
increases the value of the non-emitting firms because the net effect
of a technology-specific subsidy and a carbon tax is to increase the
equilibrium power price. In other words and in stark contrast to the
results with only a technology-specific subsidy (cf. columns (v)–(viii) of
Table 6) carbon-tax-financed subsidies deliver an increase in the value
of all carbon-free firms regardless of who is being subsidised while
moderating the increase in the value of the firm receiving the subsidy.
Finally, consumers also pay a share of the policy costs by reducing their
consumption in response to a higher power price. That is, the result is
a more equitable burden- and reward-sharing arrangement relative to
technology-specific subsidies alone.
By offering neutral support to renewable or carbon-free technologies
rather than a single one, uniform subsidies in columns (e) and (f) go fur-
ther and imply even more equitable benefit- and burden-sharing. The
excess welfare cost of policies in columns (a)–(f) range between 9%–
90% with the uniform subsidies to carbon-free technologies financed by
a carbon tax in column (f) coming closest to the cost-effective policy. In
all cases, the policies induce an expansion in generation by all carbon-
free technologies, which compensates for the decline in coal and gas
generation to a large extent. For renewable technologies the expansion
in output is achieved by increasing production along both the intensive
and extensive margins.
The last two columns report the results when the uniform subsidies
are financed using the proceeds from a power consumption tax. The
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Table 7
Implications of capital input subsidies financed by carbon or power taxes to reduce emissions by 40%.
Carbon tax to pay Power tax to pay
Technology-specific subsidy Uniform subsidy Uniform subsidy
Wind Hydro Solar Nuclear RES RES+N RES RES+N
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h)
%𝛥(?̃?, 𝑝𝐵𝑀 ) 1.3 1.0 1.6 1.3 0.9 0.8 0.0 −0.6
%𝛥(
∑
𝑖 𝑄𝑖 ,
∑
𝑖 𝑄
𝐵𝑀
𝑖
) −0.5 −0.4 −0.6 −0.4 −0.3 −0.3 0.0 0.2
𝑄𝑛𝑠
𝑤
∕(𝑄𝑤 −𝑄
𝐵𝑀
𝑤
) × 100 56.7 63.4 63.2 63.3 57.2 57.7 49.8 44.7
𝑄𝑛𝑠
ℎ
∕(𝑄ℎ −𝑄
𝐵𝑀
ℎ
) × 100 50.9 46.0 50.8 50.9 46.7 47.0 42.7 40.3
𝑄𝑛𝑠
𝑝𝑣
∕(𝑄𝑝𝑣 −𝑄
𝐵𝑀
𝑝𝑣
) × 100 60.9 61.0 54.3 60.9 55.8 56.2 50.3 46.8
%𝛥(𝑉𝑤 , 𝑉
𝐵𝑀
𝑤
) 89.4 15.2 25.4 19.3 47.1 35.8 38.6 5.7
%𝛥(𝑉ℎ , 𝑉
𝐵𝑀
ℎ
) 24.0 107.3 29.9 22.7 50.4 37.7 31.3 −9.9
%𝛥(𝑉𝑝𝑣 , 𝑉
𝐵𝑀
𝑝𝑣
) 24.3 18.0 291.5 23.0 60.4 45.2 60.2 14.2
%𝛥(𝑉𝑐 , 𝑉
𝐵𝑀
𝑐
) −32.9 −32.9 −32.9 −32.9 −32.9 −32.9 −33.4 −33.4
%𝛥(𝑉𝑔 , 𝑉
𝐵𝑀
𝑔
) −39.0 −39.9 −38.1 −39.2 −40.3 −40.5 −54.6 −54.6
%𝛥(𝑉𝑛 , 𝑉
𝐵𝑀
𝑛
) 8.7 6.5 10.7 32.7 5.5 14.0 −24.2 −0.9
𝛥𝑉 0.097 0.036 0.107 0.083 0.044 0.043 −0.173 −0.185
𝛥𝑁𝑅 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
𝛥𝐶𝑆 −0.191 −0.144 −0.235 −0.181 −0.123 −0.116 0.006 0.088
𝛥 −0.094 −0.107 −0.127 −0.098 −0.080 −0.073 −0.167 −0.097
Notes: Subsidies reduce the price of capital. RES(+N) indicates uniform capital subsidies to renewable energy sources (+ Nuclear).
differences between them and columns (e)–(f) are substantial. Com-
paring columns (e) and (g), the difference is driven by the significant
decline in the nuclear firm’s generation share and market value, even
though the aggregate market outcomes are indistinguishable from the
BM equilibrium. Comparing (f) and (h), we underline that the positive
effect of subsidies and the negative effect of power consumption taxes
net out differently for different technologies. Specifically, the value of
hydro and nuclear firms decline approximately 10% and 1% respec-
tively despite the subsidy they receive while the wind and solar firms
increase in value by 6% and 14% relative to the BM equilibrium.
To summarise, there are two main messages emerging from Table 7.
First, taking the financing method as given, it is preferable to offer
subsidies to as broad a set of carbon-free technologies as possible.
Second, taking the set of subsidy recipients as given, it is preferable
to finance the subsidies using the revenues from a carbon tax.
Finally, we note that Appendix D discusses the sensitivity of our
results to alternative country contexts and parameterisations. Specifi-
cally, we reparameterise using data for France and Poland, where the
generation mix is significantly different from Spain. Moreover, we vary
key parameters in a systematic way. These changes have quantitative
implications, however, our qualitative conclusions regarding the cost-
effectiveness of policies and their supply-side distributional impacts are
unaltered.
6. Conclusion and policy implications
This paper studies the distributional impact of carbon emissions
reduction policies on power suppliers. We construct, parameterise and
solve a partial equilibrium model of the power sector. A novel feature
of the model is site-specific generation in key renewable technologies
where productivity differs across sites. We use the model to analyse
the differential effects of alternative policy instruments used by gov-
ernments to reduce emissions. We also pay attention to how they affect
the firms’ value and the government’s fiscal position.
Our analysis yields several policy messages. A carbon price is the
cost-effective instrument to reduce power sector emissions. In our set-
up it can equivalently be implemented using a carbon tax or emissions
trading. This is well-known but our model sheds light on the factors
behind this result. Carbon pricing treats carbon-free firms equally, uses
the extensive margin of renewable generation efficiently, and therefore
improves the firms’ market value.
A power consumption tax implies a very high welfare cost because
it reduces the size of the power market, and by doing so decreases
the value of all firms (both carbon-emitting and carbon-free) and
reduces consumer surplus. From a welfare perspective, power consump-
tion taxes should not be the instrument of choice, neither to reduce
emissions, nor to finance subsidies aiming to reduce emissions.
Technology-specific input subsidies can be designed to achieve
emissions reduction at the same welfare cost as output subsidies. From
a welfare perspective, therefore, they are substitutes. However, firms
will prefer output subsidies, because they increase their market value
by more, while the government would rather offer input subsidies,
because they are cheaper to finance. Importantly, these subsidies can
hurt carbon-free generators that are not subsidised by making them lose
market share and profits. Technology-specific subsidies financed by a
carbon tax result in a more equitable distribution of the burden and
rewards of climate policies than those financed by general tax revenues.
However, while they are more cost-effective than subsidies financed by
general tax revenues or borrowing, they are not as effective as carbon
pricing alone.
We abstract from many relevant aspects of reality to isolate the
distributional channels we are interested in. There are no externalities
in the model which are often the main justification for subsidies in real-
world contexts. For example, the innovation externalities in renewables
generation are well documented but we assume technology is con-
stant, deterministic and exogenous. Similarly, the higher power prices
induced by power consumption taxes are often justified as a means
of encouraging energy efficiency. To the extent that higher power
prices remove barriers to energy conservation, their negative welfare
effect will be diminished. Energy storage, e.g. greater hydro capacity
or batteries, is absent from the model. Adding it would improve the
productivity of intermittent generation. Our model takes as given the
existence of a grid infrastructure, the vintage and sophistication of
which affects generators differently and may result in under- or delayed
investment in modernising it. Methodologically, time and uncertainty
are important but missing. By considering these explicitly, the model
can go beyond characterising the broad features of a policy-driven
low-carbon economy and study the challenging issues in the dynamic
transition to it.
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